The ways in which natural selection can allow the proliferation of cooperative behavior have long been seen as a central problem in evolutionary biology. Most of the literature has focused on interactions between pairs of individuals and on linear public goods games. This emphasis led to the conclusion that even modest levels of migration would pose a serious problem to the spread of altruism in group structured populations. Here we challenge this conclusion, by analyzing evolution in a framework which allows for complex group interactions and random migration among groups. We conclude that contingent forms of strong altruism can spread when rare under realistic group sizes and levels of migration. Our analysis combines group-centric and gene-centric perspectives, allows for arbitrary strength of selection, and leads to extensions of Hamilton's rule for the spread of altruistic alleles, applicable under broad conditions. natural selection | population genetics | evolutionary game theory | group selection | kin selection | altruism | Hamilton's rule | iterated public goods game
Introduction
The evolution of cooperation and altruism are fundamental scientific challenges highlighted by their role in the major transitions in life's history, when natural selection acted simultaneously on several competing levels [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] . In this context, the relevance of basic concepts, including group selection and Hamilton's rule remain controversial [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] . Here we address these problems by studying a framework for evolution in group structured populations that incorporates inter-and intra-group competition and migration. Combining group-centric with gene-centric perspectives in a constructive group/kin selection approach, we build methodology that allows for the analysis of arbitrary non-linear fitness functions, resulting from complex multi-individual interactions across life cycles. We obtain the conditions for a rare social allele to invade the population. This is obtained in a mathematically rigorous way, by analyzing the stability of the equilibrium in which this allele is absent. This analysis is done for arbitrary strength of selection, but when selection is weak and groups are large the condition for invasion simplifies significantly into a form that is easy to apply and provides substantial intuition. In the case of linear fitness functions, the condition for invasion is identical to Hamilton's rule, and it is natural to regard the more general non-linear cases as generalizations of that rule. Our results also show that one of the most widely used approaches to analyzing kin selection models, [18] , [7] (condition (6.7)), and [16] (Box 6), yields incorrect results in some biologically relevant situations.
Our results reveal biologically realistic conditions under which altruism can evolve when rare, but genetic relatedness in groups is modest. In this way we challenge a common understanding according to which inter-group selection favoring altruism could only override intra-group selection favoring selfishness under exceptional conditions, namely small group size and very low migration rates [13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27] . We identify the emphasis on linear public goods games in the literature, including most of these papers, as having supported this belief. In contrast, we show that for iterated public goods games, in which altruists cooperate or not in each round based on previous outcomes [28, 31] , altruism can spread even when groups are large, selection is weak and migration rates are substantially larger than the inverse of group size. This result corrects [31] , who predicted that large group size would not allow cooperation to spread when rare in this model. For species that live in groups, several vital group activities repeat themselves periodically and behavior changes as feedback is obtained from previous iterations. The iterated public goods game that we study is therefore often more realistic than a simple one shot public goods game. A proper analysis of this model fills therefore an important gap in the literature. To obtain our result we show that in the absence of selection, when groups are large, the fraction of group members that are close relatives of a randomly chosen individual has a non-Gaussian distribution with a fat tail. As a consequence, even when altruistic alleles are rare in the population, they have a significant probability of concentrating in some groups, accruing substantial reproductive gains through multi-individual synergy.
The two-level Fisher-Wright framework
When members of a species live in groups, their reproductive success depends on the behavior of all group members. More efficient groups may grow faster and split, outcompeting the less efficient ones that die out. On the other hand, individuals may free ride on the cooperation of other members of their group, and in this way outcompete them. This picture is further complicated by migration among groups. The Twolevel Fisher-Wright framework with selection and migration (2lFW) captures all these elements, in a simplified fashion. In 2lFW haploid individuals live in a large number g of groups of size n, and are of two genetically determined phenotypic types, A or N. Generations do not overlap, reproduction is asexual and the type is inherited by the offspring. (Mutations will be considered briefly later.) The relative fitness (w) of a type A, and that of a type N, in a group that has k types A, are, respectively, w Fig. 1 describes the creation of a new generation in the 2lFW through inter-and intra-group competition, followed by migration at rate m.
Cases in which types A behave in some altruistic fashion are of particular interest [33] . Most of the literature concerns the very special case of a linear public goods game (PG), defined by v
, 0 < C < B, in which each type A cooperates, at a cost C to herself, providing a benefit B shared by the other members of her group. The need to consider more complex intra-group Emails: rhs@math.ucla.edu, rvicente@ime.usp.br and nestor@if.usp.br interactions and non-linear payoff functions is, nevertheless, well known [10, 14, 28, 30, 29, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43] . Non-linearities appear naturally whenever activities involve many group members simultaneously. They result from threshold phenomena, increasing returns to scale, saturation, etc. For instance, to hunt large prey may require a large minimum number of hunters, the likelihood of success may first increase rapidly with the number of hunters, but it may plateau when this number becomes very large. Allowing for the analysis of such synergistic multi-individual interactions and activities is a central feature of our approach, distinguishing it from theoretical frameworks based on pairwise interactions, or single actors benefiting a group [4, 44, 45] . 
(Center) FW Intragroup competition: If a group descends from a group with k types A, then it will have i types A with probability P (k, i) = bin(i | n, kw A k /nw k ), where the binomial probability bin(i|n, q) is the probability of i successes in n independent trials, each with probability q of success. (Right) Migration: Once the new g groups have been formed according to the two-level competition process, a random fraction m of the individuals migrates. Migrants are randomly shuffled. Note: The assignment of relative fitness to the groups in the fashion done above is a necessary and sufficient condition [32] for individuals in the parental generation to have each an expected number of offspring proportional to their personal relative fitness.
The 2lFW framework can be seen as a generalization of the trait-group framework (see Sec. 2.3.2 of [5] ), which corresponds to the case m = 1. One can interpret 1 − m as an assortment parameter. Because migration is completely random in 2lFW, this assortment represents a worst case scenario, abstracting away additional assortment caused by kin recognition, greenbeard effects, selective acceptance of migrants, joint migration of individuals, etc. It is well known [28, 31, 36] that even when m = 1 non-linearities in fitness functions allow for coexistence of cooperators and defectors. But under the strong altruism condition v A k+1 < v N k (meaning that each type A would be better off mutating into a type N), this is not the case [33, 46] . One of our goals is to determine the level of migration compatible with invasion by rare strong altruists.
The 2lFW also generalizes the "typical kin selection model" of [47] , where the payoffs were those of PG, and the analysis relied on this and on the assumption of weak selection. That paper was a response to [48] , where group selection was argued to be an important mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, and a multilevel selection model based on Moran's model was introduced. Our analysis of 2lFW with non-linear fitness functions highlights the importance of combining group-centric with gene-centric perspectives, and shows that group selection can be an important force in evolution under realistic conditions. It also shows that mathematically rigorous analysis can be carried out even when selection is strong and fitness functions are non-linear. And it shows that one has to be very careful in applying mathematically nonrigorous methodology, as it can produce substantially incorrect results, even when selection is weak.
A basic example: Iterated public goods game
Non-linearities in life-cycle payoffs can result from activities repeating themselves during a lifetime, and behavior being contingent on previous outcomes. A basic example is the iterated public goods game (IPG) [28, 31] . In IPG a PG is repeated an average of T times in a life-cycle. We will suppose that types N never cooperate, while types A cooperate in the first round and later cooperate only if at least a fraction α of group members cooperated in the previous round. Mathematically, this model generalizes the iterated prisoner dilemma and tit-for-tat, from the dyadic setting of [49] and [50] to the multi-individual setting. But while direct or indirect reciprocity requires the identification of individuals in the group, this is not the case here. The behavior of types A in the IPG can be triggered by individuals simply discontinuing cooperative behavior when previous cooperation produced negative feedback to them. In other words, allele A can predispose individuals to cooperate, but as they do it and obtain feedback from that behavior, they may continue it or discontinue it. The IPG is in this sense closely related to generalized reciprocity mechanisms [51] with low cognitive requirements. Negative feedback from cooperation should occur if the fraction of group members that cooperated was less than C/B, but not if it was larger than that threshold, since in the former case the payoff to a cooperator is negative, while in the latter case it is positive. This gives a special role to the value α = C/B. If α ≤ C/B, the behavior of types A is altruistic in the strong sense that each type A individual would increase its fitness if it behaved as a type N, everything else being equal, i.e., v Fig. 2 displays a detailed analysis of some instances of the IPG, giving conditions for allele A to spread when rare. For many species that live and interact in groups for many years, several vital activities, including collective hunting and food sharing, can repeat themselves hundreds or thousands of times in a lifecycle, giving plausibility to the values of T in Fig. 2. (The assumption that individuals discontinue behavior after a single unsuccessful participation is a simplification. When this is not a realistic assumption, one can interpret the parameter T as the ratio between the typical number of repetitions of the activity and the typical number of unsuccessful attempts before cooperation is discontinued by a type A.) Panel C, in which selection is weak and groups are large, shows two important contrasting results. When T = 1, and the IPG is identical to the PG, allele A can only invade under Hamilton's condition R = FST > C/B. But as T increases, the level of relatedness needed for invasion drops substantially, so that for modest values of B/C, allele A can invade under R = FST significantly lower than 10%, compatible with levels observed in several species, including humans [27] (Table 8. 3), [42] , [52] (Tables  6.4 and 6 .5), [53] , [54] (Table 4. 
Condition for invasion under strong selection
To analyze the 2lFW, denote by f k (t), k = 0, ..., n the fraction of groups in generation t that have exactly k types A. Denote by p(t) = n k=1 (k/n)f k (t) the frequency of types A in the population. The state of the population in generation t is described by the vector f (t) = (f1(t), ..., fn(t)), since f0(t) = 1− n k=1 f k (t). We will suppose that g >> n, so that, by the law of large numbers, f (t) evolves as a deterministic (non-linear) dynamical system in dimension n. Here we will study its linearization close to the fixed point (0, ..., 0), with no types A. This means that we are restricting ourselves to the case in which p << 1, and studying the conditions for allele A to invade the population when rare. With notation introduced in Fig. 1 , we have then f (t + 1) = f (t)M (A + B), where M k,i =w k P (k, i), Ai,j = bin(j | i, 1−m) and Bi,j = m, if j = 1, Bi,j = 0 if j = 1. Matrix M represents the production of groups in the new generation, through the two-level competition. Matrix A represents the effect of types A migrating out of groups, and matrix B represents the effect of these migrant types A joining groups that previous to migration had no types A. (When p << 1, the migrant types A are a small fraction of the migrant population, and therefore each one is likely to settle in a different group that had no types A before migration.) A standard application of the Perron-Frobenius Theorem implies that when t >> 1, we have, in good approximation, f (t) = Cρ t ν, where C is a constant that depends on f (0), ρ > 0 is the leading eigenvalue of M (A + B) and ν is its corresponding left-eigenvector normalized as a probability vector. This means that, regardless of the initial distribution f (0), with 0 < p(0) << 1, demographics and natural selection drive f (t) towards multiples of ν, in what can be seen as self-organization of copies of A in the optimal stable way for them to spread. Once this has happened, p(t) grows at rate ρ. Consequently, allele A will proliferate, when rare, if the viability condition ρ > 1 holds, and it will vanish if ρ < 1. (See Fig. 2 and SI Appendix (Sections 1 and 2) for applications, illustrations and further explanations.) When ρ > 1, even if allele A is initially absent, a small rate of mutation will introduce it, allowing it to then invade the population. In the terminology of evolutionary game theory (see, e.g., [27] Chapter 7), phenotype N is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) when ρ < 1 and N is not an ESS when ρ > 1.
The viability condition ρ > 1 has a gene-centric (kinselection) interpretation in terms of average (neighbor modulated) fitnesses. For this purpose, define ∆p(t) = p(t + 1) − p(t). Then it is well known thatW ∆p = p(
, where W A and W N are the average fitnesses of types A and N, andW = pW A + (1 − p)W N is the average fitness of all individuals. If we choose a random type A, it will have probability proportional to kf k of being in a group with exactly k types A (Bayesian sampling bias).
we choose a random individual, it is likely to be in a group with no types A. Therefore, in good approximation,W = 1. Since f (t) is driven towards multiples of ν, we obtain
provided p << 1 and t >> 1 (the error term is of order p 2 + β t , with 0 < β < 1). The viability condition ρ > 1 can also be stated as ∆p > 0, in (1) . It is important to observe that p(t) does not need to be monotone, and that ∆p > 0 is the proper condition for invasion only when, as in (1), one is considering the stationary regime, t >> 1.
Weak selection
If selection is weak, i.e., δ << 1, migration acts much faster than selection, providing a separation of time scales [3, 47, 55, 56, 57] . This allows us to replace ν in (1) with ν 0 , obtained by assuming δ = 0. Algebraic simplifications (presented in SI Appendix (Section 5)) allow us then to rewrite the neighbor modulated fitness relation (1) in the form
(the error term is of order δ 2 ), where πQ = π and n k=1 π k = 1, with
The Markov transition matrix Q and its invariant distribution π have natural interpretations in terms of identity by descent (IBD) under neutral genetic drift, as we explain next when we provide a second derivation of (2) .
Two individuals are said to be IBD if following their lineages back in time, they coalesce before a migration event affects either one. The separation of time scales implies that when selection acts, the demographic distribution is well approximated by that obtained in equilibrium with δ = 0. This means that in good approximation
, where π k is the δ = 0 equilibrium probability that in the group of a randomly chosen focal type A there are exactly k types A (focal included). But because we are supposing that types A are rare, the only individuals that are type A in this group are those that are IBD to the focal, so that π k is also the probability that exactly k individuals in this group are IBD to the focal. As in the derivation of (1), since types A are rare, we haveW = 1 and hence ∆p = p(
To compute π, we will use the standard Kronecker notation δj,i = 1 if j = i and δj,i = 0 if j = i. Now, the probability πj that the focal is IBD to exactly j − 1 other members of her group is δj,1 if the focal is a migrant (probability m), while if she is not a migrant (probability 1 − m), then we have to consider how many individuals in her mother's group were IBD to her mother. If, counting her mother, that number was i (probability πi, assuming demographic equilibrium) then the probability that the focal is IBD to exactly j − 1 other members of her group is equal to the probability that of the n − 1 other members of her group, exactly j − 1 are non-migrants who chose for mother one of the i candidates (among n possibilities) that were IBD to the focal's mother (probability bin(j − 1|n − 1, (1 − m)i/n)). Combining these pieces, we have
This is exactly the same as the set of equations πQ = π.
The IBD distribution π contains all the relevant information about genetic relatedness in the groups, including and exceeding that given by the average relatedness between group members, R = (1 − m) 2 /(n − (n − 1)(1 − m) 2 ), obtained from lineages, regression coefficients, or Wright's FST statistics. Specifically, we can define R as the probability that a second member chosen from the focal's group is IBD to the focal and then obtain (from linearity of expected values) that R = (( n k=1 kπ k ) − 1)/(n − 1) is a linear function of π's first moment. When v A k is a non-linear function of k, more information contained in π, including its higher moments, are needed to decide whether ∆p > 0 in (2) . It is important to also stress that (2) can be easily used for applications in which even the knowledge of all the moments of π (see [55] ) would be cumbersome to apply, as for instance in the computation of the short horizontal red lines in Fig. 2 , Panels A and B.
Large groups under weak selection
The stationarity condition π = πQ allows for a recursive computation of all the moments of π (see SI Appendix (Section 5)). These moments can then be used to show the powerful result that if n is large and m is small, then π, when properly rescaled, is close to a beta distribution, with mean R = FST (see SI Appendix (Section 6)). In this case, if in addition to the assumption of weak selection, also v 
where R = . Equations (1) and (3) play complementary roles in the analysis of 2lFW. Both provide the condition for invasion by allele A; (1) holds in full generality, while (3) requires special assumptions (small δ, large n), but is computationally much simpler and provides a great deal of intuition, as we discuss next.
Equation (3) should be contrasted with what [31] predicted by supposing that the number of individuals in a group that are IBD to a focal individual would be well approximated by a binomial with n − 1 attempts and probability R of success. That would lead to a normal distribution, narrowly concentrated close to its mean R, in place of the beta distribution above. Our result reveals a strong dependency structure among lineages, producing the beta distribution, with a standard deviation comparable to its mean, and a tail that decays slowly compared to a Gaussian distribution. As a consequence, fitness functions that are large only when the fraction of types A in a group is above a threshold value, as in the IPG, will allow for proliferation of types A under levels of relatedness substantially lower than that predicted under the assumption in [31] . We will refer to the fact that the fraction of group members that are IBD to a focal individual has a non-vanishing standard deviation, even when selection is weak and groups are large, as persistence of variability. This phenomenon poses a severe limitation to the applicability of covariance-regression methods in which regression of fitness on genotype is replaced with derivatives, as in [18] , [16] (Box 6), [7] (condition (6.7)). Both the assumptions in [31] , or in [18] applied to the IPG would have implied incorrectly that when selection is weak and groups are large, types A could only invade the population when rare if R > C/B (these computations are presented in the SI Appendix (Sections 8 and 9)). In a companion paper [58] we show that methodologies in which one expresses the fitness of a focal individual in terms of partial derivatives with respect to the focal individual's phenotype and the phenotype of the individuals with whom the focal interacts, as in [3, 7, 16, 18, 45, 47] , require v A x to be a linear function of x.
For the PG, (2) and (3) clearly reduce to the well known ∆p = pδ(−C + BR). The same is also true for the more general (1), as was shown in [21] , where in case of strong selection the relatedness R depends on the payoff functions. In contrast, if we are under the conditions of (3) with v
where If also C/B << 1, then R = C/B ln T = C/B 2.3 log 10 T .
[ 6 ]
The simplicity and transparency of (5) and (6) illustrate the power of (3), and Fig. 2 shows how well they compare to the more general, but less transparent (1) . Note also how (5) and (6) provide a direct grasp on the effect of the number of repetitions in the game, and a nice comparison between the PG and the IPG. Both Fig. 2 and (6) show that alleles that promote contingent cooperative behavior, which is discontinued when participation is low, can spread under levels of genetic relatedness ( = FST ) more than 5 times smaller than C/B. This mechanism should, therefore, be seriously investigated as a possible route for the proliferation of altruistic/cooperative behavior.
Conclusions
1. Natural selection in group structured populations is best analyzed by a combination of group-centric and genecentric perspectives and methods. Both shed light, carry intuition and provide computational power, in different ways. Rigorous mathematical analysis of models is necessary, especially when fitness functions are non-linear, to assess the validity of non-rigorous approaches. 2. Contingent forms of group altruism that are discontinued when participation is low can proliferate under biologically realistic conditions. Their role in the spread of altruism should be empirically investigated. 3. Natural selection can promote traits that (in net terms over a full life-cycle) are costly to the actors and beneficial to the other members of their group, under demographic conditions that are not stringent. This can happen in large groups and with realistically high levels of gene flow. Excessive focus on one-shot linear public goods games in the literature has obscured this fact.
